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Abstract
We introduce a dynamic model of resource-grabbing by status-conscious agents, i.e.,
agents value not only their absolute consumption levels, but also the relative status
within their reference group. We explore the eﬀect of the concern for relative consump-
tion on the growth rate and the welfare of an economy where agents appropriate from
a common property resource. Our model shows that the greater is agents’ concern
about their relative status, the more aggressively they tend to behave. Consequently,
the social welfare is lower because the growth rate of the public asset is reduced due
to higher extraction rate. We also consider the eﬀect of increased heterogeneity, and
show that social welfare decreases as the distribution of status-consciousness among
agents widens.
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11 Introduction
The tragedy of the commons has been a useful notion in explaining many economic phe-
nomena, ranging from the degradation of environmental assets (such as the global warming
problem) to the poor economic performance of less developed countries ridden by rent-seeking
activities. Static models of the tragedy of the commons (e.g. Hardin, 1968, Hirshleifer,1983,
Cornes, 1995) explain why agents over-use common-property resources, or why voluntary
contributions to a public good fail to provide it at the socially eﬃcient level. Dynamic mod-
els of common access can explain why some countries suﬀer low growth. For example, Tornell
and Lane (1999) used a dynamic model of exploitation of a common property renewable re-
source as a metaphor for the grabbing of tax revenue from the formal sector by powerful
groups (such as provincial governors, labor unions, patronage networks). They showed that
rent-seeking by powerful groups can result in low GDP growth rates.
A common feature shared by the above-mentioned models of tragedy of the commons
is the assumption that agents care only about their absolute consumption levels. This
assumption, while useful as a simplifying device, has recently been criticized because of
mounting empirical evidence that individuals care about relative consumption (or relative
income) as well as absolute consumption: a person’s happiness depends on the comparison
of her consumption level with that of other members of her peer group. An individual is
h a p p i e rt h em o r eh e rc o n s u m p t i o n( o ri n c o m e )level exceeds the average consumption (or
income) of her reference group; see the empirical evidence presented in Clark and Oswald
(1996), Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), Luttmer (2005), Dynan and Ravina (2007), among
others. A similar point, concerning relative status, can be made about “powerful groups”
that play a central role in the models of Tornell and Lane (1996, 1999), and Tornell and
Velasco (1992); however, these authors assume these groups care only about their absolute
consumption levels. The following question then arises: if agents who exploit a common
property renewable resource (either in the literal sense, or in the ﬁgurative sense) care about
their relative performance (consumption, income, or other indices of status), would social
welfare and the growth rate of the public asset be more adversely aﬀected compared to the
case where they care only about their absolute performance?
Consider for example the case of a lake that is eﬀe c t i v e l yac o m m o np r o p e r t yt oan u m b e r
of municipalities, or provinces. Suppose the leader of each municipality is rewarded according
to some relative performance criterion, such as relative employment levels or relative local
(municipal) GDP growth rates.1 Would these leaders have stronger incentive to allow local
1We thank the co-editor, professor Dilip Mookherjee, for suggesting this example.
2businesses to pollute the lake? It seems that this type of situation is in fact observable in
several parts of China, and also in some OECD countries. It has been argued in the Chinese
press that the severe pollution of Taihu Lake in China was partly because local GDP growth
was used as a component of performance evaluation of government oﬃcials, mayors, and
even directors of state-owned enterprises. A newspaper article commented that “if local
governments and oﬃcials do not change their attitude and the evaluation system is not
improved through eﬃcient political reform, Taihu Cyan Bacteria pollution and Shuyang’s
water pollution will come again, even in a larger scale”.2 This type of arguments seems to
have had some impact in China: it has been reported that China’s western province Qinghai
has dropped comparative local GDP growth rates from its list of criteria for evaluating the
performance of government oﬃcials in two prefectures, Yushu and Golok3.A s a r e s u l t ,
once vanished wetlands have reappeared. The province of Jiangsu has similarly reduced the
emphasis on local GDP growth rates as a tool for measuring the performance of oﬃcials.
Mismanagement of resources caused by inter-jurisdiction rivalry fuelled by comparison
of local economic performances is not restricted to the developing world. In Australia, the
pollution of the Murray-Darling river system can to some extent be attributed to inter-
state rivalry. The Murray river is the natural border between two states, New South Wales
and Victoria, which are well known for their rivalry4. Excessive irrigation by farmers on
both sides of the river has resulted in severe environmental damages associated with the
irrigation-induced-salinity problem (see Connor, (2005), Diamond (2005), Legras and Lifran
(2008)), that ultimately hurt both states5. The state governments have resisted the federal
government’s attempt to resolve the problem.
The main purpose of our paper is to explore the eﬀect of the concern for relative con-
sumption (or relative income) on the tragedy of the commons, both in the sense of common
access natural resources, and in the sense of rent-seeking ﬁscal appropriations. We take as
our starting point the model of Tornell and Lane (1996, 1999), where powerful groups grab
revenue from a common-access resource. Their model is however diﬀerent from ours in two
important respects: ﬁrst, their agents care only about absolute consumption, and second,
2See httpp://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2007-07/06/content_6336407.htm (original text in Chi-
nese).
3See China Daily, 02/04/2008, “Saying farewell to the GDP growth cult”, p.4.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-02/04/content_6440091.htm.
4The licence plates for vehicles registered in the state of New South Wales bear the unmistakable slogan:
“NSW: the Premier State”. On the other hand, residents of the state of Victoria, who call themselves
Victorians, are known for looking down on the “Sydney-siders.”
5The environmental problems of this river system also hurt the downstream state, South Australia. Parts
of the problems involve the excessive use of water by the most upstream state, Queensland, known as “The
Sunshine State.”
3they assume that rent-seekers are homogeneous6. In contrast, we assume that agents gain
utility from both absolute consumption and relative consumption, and we also consider the
case where agents diﬀer with respect to some characteristics.
The economic literature on relative consumption can be traced back to Smith (1759)
and Veblen (1899). Duesenberry (1949) and Pollak (1976) were among the ﬁrst to formalize
the theory of relative consumption. In the more recent literature, the interdependence in
consumption has been subjected to rigorous reﬁnements, and has been variously described
as “keeping up with the Joneses” (Gali 1994), “status” (Fisher and Hof 2000), “jealousy”
(Dupor and Liu 2003), or “envy” (Eaton and Eswaran 2003). These authors maintain the
assumption of perfect property rights, and therefore the problem of rent-seeking does not
arise in their models of status-seeking7.
In our paper, we combine rent-seeking with status-seeking, and analyze the “status-
seeking eﬀect” on the “tragedy of the commons” problem in a dynamic context, which
enables us to draw some conclusions about growth rates. We show that an increase in the
status-seeking parameter (e.g., an increase in the degree of envy) worsens the problem of
over-exploitation of resources. Agents tend to behave more aggressively if they are more
concerned about their relative status. Consequently, the social welfare is lower. In addition,
the growth rate of the public asset is reduced due to higher extraction rates. We also show
that with rent-seeking, an exogenous technical progress in the resource-extraction sector can
reduce welfare, and the magnitude of this welfare-worsening eﬀect is an increasing function
of the status-seeking parameter.
A secondary purpose of our paper is to investigate the role of heterogeneity in status-
consciousness (and in other parameters) on the tragedy of the commons. Several authors
have investigated the eﬀects of wealth inequality on the private contribution to a public
good. Olson (1983) argues that in groups of members of unequal size, the likelihood that a
public good will be provided tend to be high, for “the greater the interest in the collective
good of any single member, the greater the likelihood that member will get such a signiﬁcant
proportion of the total beneﬁt from the collective good that he will gain from seeing that the
good is provided, even if he has to pay all the cost himself” (p. 34).8This argument, while
6Furthermore, agents in their models can transfer revenue from a public capital stock to personal accounts,
in which property rights are perfectly secured. Long and Sorger (2006) extend the model to the case of
heterogeneous agents, and explicitly introduce eﬀort costs.
7Another study related to ours is Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2007), who assume, however, that property
rights are perfectly enforced and that there is no renk-seeking. Our paper is diﬀerent from theirs in that we
deal with a common-property resource stock, and we explore the impact of the “status-consciousness” on
the “tragedy of the commons” problem.
8In fact, an extreme version of this result can be proved: if marginal eﬀort cost is constant and identical
4appealing, has been qualiﬁed somewhat by authors of more recent studies. Baland and Ray
(1997) show that if eﬀorts are complements rather than substitutes (e.g., if the production of
a public good displays the Leontief technology where individual contributions are “inputs”,
so that the smallest contribution determines the total public good) perfect equality yields the
most eﬃcient outcome. Cornes (1993) show that if the production of a public good displays
the Cobb-Douglas technology (he calls this “the weaker-link case”), as income distribution
becomes more unequal, the ineﬃciency becomes very large (p. 268).
Baland and Plateau (1997) conﬁrm Olson’s intuition by showing that in a common-
property resource appropriation game, if appropriation eﬀorts are limited by credit con-
straints, the more unequal the distribution of credit constraints, the more eﬃcient the use of
the common property resource (p. 456). However, in the game of contributions to a public
good when individuals face capacity constraints, under certain assumptions, a disequalizing
change in the distribution of wealth will reduce the aggregate provision of the public good
if this change is brought about by a drastic transfer between constrained co-operators (p.
465)9. In the case where contributors are heterogeneous in terms of opportunity costs of
time, Baland and Plateau (1997) show that, if the opportunity cost of eﬀort contribution
is (i) increasing with the amount of contributed eﬀort, and (ii) is higher for more wealthy
agents, then a disequalizing change in the distribution of wealth has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the amount of public good provided (p. 470).
In a two-period model of exploitation of a growing resource (e.g. a stock of ﬁsh) under
common access, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) show that increasing inequality does
not in general favor conservation. The source of heterogeneity in this model is the diﬀerence
in production capacity (e.g. number of ﬁshing boats) across agents. Since the stock grows and
the discount rate is zero, the socially optimal solution is to set harvest equal zero in period
one, and at the maximum level in period two10. In an extension of their basic model, Dayton-
Johnson and Bardhan introduce exit options which diﬀer among agents (e.g. large ﬁshing
companies can move their boats to other ﬁshing grounds while small ones cannot).They ﬁnd
that the relationship between inequality and conservation is in general non-monotonic.
We contribute to this literature on the eﬀect of heterogeneity on the public asset and on
social welfare. In particular, we introduce two sources of heterogeneity: agents may diﬀer
across individuals, while the beneﬁt derived from a public good is proportional to wealth, then, under concave
technology (which transforms the sum of eﬀorts into output of the public good), the sole contributor is the
agent with the highest wealth. See Baland and Plateau (1997), Proposition 3.
9On the other hand, under other circumstances, a disequalizing change will increase the supply of the
public good.
10It is assumed that the sum of capacities exceed the maximum available stock in period two.
5with respect to the degree of status-consciousness as well as with respect to appropriation
cost. We show that, in our model, social welfare decreases if agents become more hetero-
geneous in terms of status-seeking, but it increases if they become more heterogeneous in
terms of appropriation costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and discuss
the key assumptions. Section 3 characterizes the solution to a cooperative equilibrium (or
the solution of a social planner’s problem). Section 4 characterizes the Markov Perfect Nash
Equilibrium and oﬀers welfare comparisons. This is followed by introducing heterogeneity
among agents, and studying the implications of increases in heterogeneity. Some concluding
remarks and some discussion on policy implications are oﬀered in Section 5.
2 A Simple Model
There are n agents. Let ci(t) denote the absolute consumption level of agent i at time t.L e t







Let zi(t) denote agent i’s relative consumption level, which we deﬁne as the ratio of her
















where δ ≡ 1/n.N o t et h a tzi(t) is bounded above by n and bounded below by zero. When
all individuals consume the same amount, zi(t)=1 .
Let Ei(t) denote agent i’s extraction rate from a common-property resource. We assume
that the consumption rate ci(t) is a fraction of the extraction rate Ei(t).S p e c i ﬁcally, Ei(t)=
(1+θi)ci(t).H e r eθi is a non-negative number that represents agent i’s “wastage rate”, which
may be interpreted as reﬂecting his degree of ineﬃciency in transforming the extracted
resource into the consumption good, or perhaps as the bribes or penalties that he must pay
to third parties in his illicit resource-appropriation process.
Let X(t) denote the stock level of the common-property resource. We assume that the





6where A ≥ 0 is a constant. In what follows, we will omit the time index for simplicity of
notation.
The net-utility function of agent i is denoted by V (zi,c i,X,E i) where
V = U(zi,c i,X) − κiEi
The variable X appears in the utility function, because the stock X provides a ﬂow of
amenities (e.g. recreational uses) that each agent values. The non-negative parameter κi
represents “the eﬀort cost” of extracting the resource. This parameter may represent (a)
a technological coeﬃcient between eﬀort and harvest level, so that a fall in κi represents a
technological progress in resource extraction, or (b) the diﬃculty with which the agent hides
his illegal activities. Note that we have introduced two separate parameters, θi and κi,t h a t
represent diﬀerent types of cost of appropriation: κi is the “eﬀort cost” which is measured
in utility units, while θi i st h e“ w a s t a g ec o s t ” ,w h i c ha c t sl i k ea ni n c o m et a x .
We assume that each individual’s gross-utility function U(zi,c i,X) is non-decreasing in
her relative consumption, zi, and increasing in her absolute consumption, ci,a n di nt h e




















and we assume that Uci > 0 and Ucici < 0. This means that, for any given C−i,t h e
individual’s utility is strictly increasing and strictly concave in his own consumption level,
ci. Strict concavity is assumed so that the second order condition for individual maximization
is satisﬁed. To proceed further, we make the following speciﬁc assumptions:
Assumption A.1: The gross-utility function takes the form
U(zi,c i,X)=G(zi)F(ci,X)
where F(ci,X) is homogeneous of degree one11, strictly-quasi-concave, and increasing in
(ci,X),a n dG(zi) is positive, non-decreasing in zi and is bounded above for all zi in the
permissible range [0,n].12
11The assumption of homogeneity of degree one in (ci,X) has been made in Sorger (2005) and Long and
Sorger (2006). It greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. As a referee points out, our results rely crucially on the
assumptions of homogeneity of degree 1 and of a constant growth rate A.
12We thank a referee for advising us to put an upper bound on the function G(zi). See section 3 for a
discussion of this boundedness assumption.
7Without loss of generality, we set G(1) = 1.I f G0(.) > 0, we say that the agents are
envious (concerned about relative consumption), while if G0(.)=0identically, we say that
t h ea g e n t sa r en o n - e n v i o u s .




It is useful to deﬁne the ratio of consumption to amenity services by βi = ci/X .Since
F(ci,X) i sh o m o g e n e o u so fd e g r e e1 ,w eo b t a i n
F(ci,X)=XF(βi,1) ≡ Xf(βi)
Under Assumption A1, it follows that f0(βi)=Fc > 0, f00(βi) < 0, r(βi) ≡ f(βi)−βif0(βi)=






















Our analysis at a general level does not rely on a speciﬁc functional form for F nor G,






1−μ where λ>0 and 0 <μ<1 and λ + μ<1
Here, the parameter λ is an indicator of the strength of the status-consciousness. Note that
U is strictly concave and increasing in ci for given C−i.S i n c ezi is bounded above by n,t h e
“envy term” zλ
i is bounded.
3 The Cooperative Equilibrium
It is useful to begin with the following benchmark scenario. All agents are identical, and we
assume they cooperate by agreeing on a common rate of resource extraction: Ei(t)=E(t).
8It follows that ci(t)=c(t) and zi(t)=1 . It is as if there were a social planner seeking to




−ρt [G(1)F(c,X) − κ(1 + θ)c]dt (1)
subject to
˙ X = AX − n(1 + θ)c
with X(0) = X0 and
lim
t→∞X(t) ≥ 0
To ensure convergence of the integral, we will assume:
Assumption A.3: The rate of discount exceeds the natural growth rate of the stock:
ρ>A .
Recall that G(1) = 1, the social planner’s problem reduces to ﬁn d i n gt h et i m ep a t ho f






−ρt [f(β) − κ(1 + θ)β]Xdt
subject to
˙ X = X [A − n(1 + θ)β]
with X(0) = X0 and
lim
t→∞X(t) ≥ 0
Let ψ denote the shadow price of the stock X. The Hamiltonian function is
H =[ f(β) − κ(1 + θ)β]X + ψX [A − n(1 + θ)β]




0(β) − κ(1 + θ) − nψ(1 + θ)} =0
˙ ψ =( ρ − A)ψ − [f(β) − (1 + θ)(κ + nψ)β]
13The social planner is assumed to treat everyone equally and symmetrically. If G(z) were unbounded, one
might argue that a social planner who considers relative-status concern as part of social welfare might want
to let individuals take turns in time, possibly repeatedly, to be the only one with positive consumption and
hence inﬁnite pleasure from being the “top dog”over some sequence of time intervals. We thank a referee for
pointing this out. Since our G(z) is bounded, it can be shown that, in the Cobb-Douglas case with a small
λ, the symmetric equilibrium maximizes social welfare even when the concern for relative status counts in
social welfare.
9and the transversality condition is
lim
t→∞ψ(t)e
−ρt ≥ 0, lim
t→∞X(t) ≥ 0, lim
t→∞ψ(t)e
−ρtX(t)=0 (2)
Let us consider a candidate solution where β(t)=β (a constant). This yields a corre-
sponding constant ψ where
f











which implies that ˙ ψ =0 , hence
(ρ − A)ψ = f(β) − (1 + θ)(κ + nψ)β (5)
Using (3) and (5),
(ρ − A)ψ = f(β) − βf
0(β) > 0 (6)















Proposition 1: Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3, the cooperative solution consists of
following the consumption strategy c = β
∗
X,w h e r eβ
∗
is the unique positive solution of
equation (7).
Proof:
First, let us show that β
∗
is unique. As shown in Fig. 1, the left-hand side (LHS) of
equation (7) is decreasing in β, and as β v a r i e sf r o mz e r ot oi n ﬁnity, the LHS varies from
inﬁnity to −κ. The RHS is positive for all positive β, and increases as β increases. Thus the
curve that represents the LHS must intersect the curve that represents the RHS exactly at










(This is because the numerator of the right-hand side of (7) is positive for all β>0,a n dt h e
denominator is positive because ρ>A ).
At the constant ratio β
∗




= A − n(1 + θ)β
∗
<A<ρ
10(which may be positive or negative) and thus
X(t)=X0e
gt
Next, to show that the strategy c = β
∗
X is optimal, we can verify that all the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions are satisﬁed. The transversality condition (2) is met. Since the
objective function (1) is concave in (c,X), and the constraints are linear, the necessary
conditions are also suﬃcient.
Remark 1: Condition (7) has a straightforward interpretation. Given any β,c o n s i d e ra
small decrease in per-capita extraction, say dE at time zero. This will lead to a small decrease
in consumption by dc = dE/(1 + θ). The marginal utility loss from reduced consumption
(net of reduced extraction cost κ)i st h u s
£
f0(β)(1 + θ)−1 − κ
¤
dE. On the other hand, the


















At the optimal β
∗
, the marginal utility loss from reduced consumption must equal the mar-
ginal utility gain from increased amenity services.





n(1 − μ)(1 + θ)
and thus the growth rate of the public asset is
g = A −
μ(ρ − A)
1 − μ
which can be negative or positive.
















































) − κ(1 + θ)β
∗
ρ − A + n(1 + θ)β
∗
where, since ρ − A>0, ρ − g>0.
Now, from (5) and (6),
(ρ − A)ψ = f(β) − βf
0(β)=f(β) − β(1 + θ)(κ + nψ) (9)
we obtain ³











) − κ(1 + θ)β
∗



















Thus welfare (per person) is the product of the shadow price ψ
∗
and the stock X0.
An increase in κ or θ will shift down the curve representing the left-hand side (LHS) of
equation (7), so the intersection β
∗





(ρ − A)(1 + θ)
h




































A similar calculation shows that welfare falls if θ increases.
4 Non-cooperative resource extraction by status-conscious
agents
In this section, we study a diﬀerential game involving n identical players. Consider individual
i.S h ef a c e sn−1 rival rent-seekers. Suppose she thinks that each rival j adopts a consumption
strategy having a stationary feedback (i.e., stationary Markovian) form
cj(t)=φj(X(t)) where φ
0
j(X) > 0 and φj(0) = 0
12That is, at any moment of time, individual j’s consumption depends only on the currently
observed stock level X(t). The restriction that φj(0) = 0 makes sense: when the resource








The optimization problem for individual i is then to choose a time path of consumption




















This problem is a standard optimal control problem. Suppose the problem has a solution:
ap a i ro ft i m ep a t h s(ci(t),X(t)) that maximizes the objective function. Then one can express
the optimal control ci(t) as a function of the stock X(t).D e n o t et h i sf u n c t i o nb ygi(X):
ci(t)=gi(X(t))
Such a function gi(X) is player i’s “optimal Markovian strategy”, given Φ(X).More formally,
we say that the function gi(.) is player i’s Markovian best reply to the (n − 1) tuple of
Markovian strategies of her rivals, (φ1(.),φ 2(.),...,φ i−1(.),φ i+1(.),...,φ n(.)).
We are interested in the scenario where all players are facing similar optimization prob-
l e m s .T h i si sad i ﬀerential game among n players.
Deﬁnition: A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game described above is a






n(.)) such that, for each player i (i =
1,2,...,n),t h ef u n c t i o nφ
∗
i(.) is player i’s Markovian best reply to the (n−1)tuple of Markov-










n(.)) .(For a more precise and
more general deﬁnition, see Dockner et al., 2000, or Long and Sorger, 2006.)
4.1 Finding a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium: the case of iden-
tical agents
In this subsection, we will show that, when agents are identical, the game described above
has a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which all players adopt the same linear
13Markovian strategy
cj(t)=βX(t)
where β is a positive constant.
Suppose player i knows that all other players use the strategy cj(t)=βX(t).The opti-









δci +( 1− δ)βX
¶




˙ X = AX − (n − 1)(1 + θ)βX − (1 + θ)ci
lim
t→∞X(t) ≥ 0
We may interpret A−(n−1)(1+θ)β as player i’s net rate of return on holding the asset.
Let ψi be the co-state variable. The Hamiltonian is
Hi = G(zi)F(ci,X) − κ(1 + θ)ci + ψi [AX − (n − 1)(1 + θ)βX − (1 + θ)ci]





(δci +( 1− δ)βX)
2
¶
F(ci,X)+G(zi)Fci (ci,X) − (κ + ψi)(1 + θ)=0 (13)




(δci +( 1− δ)βX)
2
¶




= AX − (n − 1)(1 + θ)βX − (1 + θ)ci (15)
lim
t→∞e
−ρtψi(t) ≥ 0 and lim
t→∞e
−ρtψi(t)X(t)=0 (16)







We must verify that the optimality conditions (13) to (16) are satisﬁed when the strategies
described by equation (17) are used, for some suitable constant β>0.








0 (β) − κ(1 + θ) − (1 + θ)ψi(t)=0 (18)
14This equation implies that ψi(t) is a constant, i.e. ˙ ψi =0along the equilibrium play. Hence
we must have
ψi [ρ − A +( n − 1)(1 + θ)β]=
−G
0 (1)(1 − δ)f(β)+G(1)[f (β) − f
0 (β)β] (19)












G(1)[f (β) − f
0 (β)β] (20)
Proposition 3: A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, where all players play a linear
feedback strategy of the form c = βX, exists if and only if the equation (20) has a solution
b β>0.
Remark: As u ﬃcient condition for the existence of a solution b β>0 to equation (20) is
that G0(1) is suﬃciently small. To see this, note that the right-hand side of equation (20)
is a positive and increasing function of β, as depicted in Figure 1, and that if G0(1) is very
small, the last term on the left-hand side is almost zero, while the term inside the curly
brackets is positive for small β and negative for large β. Hence an intersection must exist at
some positive β.







Here, G(z)=zλ, G0(z)=λzλ−1, G(1) = 1, G0(1) = λ, f(β)=β
μ, f0(β)=μβ
μ−1, f(β) −










[(ρ − A)+( n − 1)(1 + θ)β]=
−(1 − δ)λβ









(1 − λ(1 − δ) − μ)
(ρ − A)β
−1 +( n − 1)(1 + θ)
(21)
The LHS of equation (21) is decreasing in β.A sβ varies from zero to inﬁnity, the LHS falls
from (λ(1 − δ)+μ)/(1 + θ) to minus inﬁnity if κ>0. The RHS is increasing in β,v a r y i n g
15from zero to the positive number (1−λ(1−δ)−μ)/[(n − 1)(1 + θ)] as β varies from zero to
inﬁnity. It follows that if κ>0, there exists a unique positive b β that equates the LHS with
the RHS. Furthermore, an increase in κ will lower the curve representing the LHS, resulting
in a smaller value of b β.A n i n c r e a s e i n λ will shift the curve representing the RHS down,
and shift the curve representing the LHS up, resulting in a higher value of b β.I fκ =0then
a positive b β exists if and only if n(λ(1 − δ)+μ) < 1; we will assume that this inequality
holds. In that case,
b β =
(ρ − A)(λ(1 − δ)+μ)
(1 + θ)[1− n(λ(1 − δ)+μ)]
(22)
Do these results apply to the general case? The answer is yes, provided the equation (20)
has a unique solution b β>0. Without loss of generality, we set G(1) = 1 and treat G0(1)
as a parameter: the higher is G0(1), the higher is the degree of status-consciousness of the
players. To simplify notation, denote the status consciousness parameter by λ ≡ G0(1).
Proposition 4: (The general case) Assume b β is unique. Then
(a) A higher degree of status-consciousness will result in a higher equilibrium rate of
extraction and a lower public asset growth rate.
(b) An increase in κ or A will reduce the equilibrium rate of extraction, b β and thus
increase the growth rate of the public asset.
Proof:T h eR H So fe q u a t i o n( 2 0 )i si n c r e a s i n gi nβ, and is equal zero at β =0 .T h e
LHS of (20) approaches inﬁnity as β approaches zero from positive values. Thus if the two
curves intersect at a unique b β, i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h eL H Sc u t st h eR H Sf r o ma b o v e .
An increase in G0(1) will shift upwards the curve representing the LHS of (20). Hence the
intersection point b β must move to the right. Similarly, an increase in κ or A shift downwards
the curve representing the LHS of (20), thus moving b β to the left. The growth rate of the




MPE = A − n(1 + θ)b β
I tf o l l o w st h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nκ or A will increase the growth rate of the public asset.
Remark: The result (b) above is in sharp contrast to that of Long and Sorger (2006),
where an increase in κ (interpreted as an increase in the cost of money laundering) will
increase extraction, and reduce the growth rate of the public asset. The reason for the
diﬀerence is that in Long and Sorger (2006), agents can “store” the amount they extract
from the common-property resources by investing it in a private asset. In our model, the
quantity extracted must be consumed. Also, for the same reason, our result is diﬀerent from
16Tornell and Lane (1999), in that in our model an increase in A, the return of the public
asset, will not result in greater appropriation rates.
Proposition 5: (comparing the cooperative solution with the non-cooperative equilib-
rium.) The non-cooperative rate of extraction, b β, is greater than the cooperative rate of
extraction β
∗
. Thus, there occurs a tragedy of the commons.


















[ρ − A +( n − 1)(1 + θ)β]+λ(1 − δ)f (β)=f(β) − βf
0(β)
(24)
We ﬁrst prove that when λ =0 , b β must exceed β
∗
. Both equations have the same right-hand
side, which is an increasing function of β; as β varies from 0 to inﬁnity, f(β) − βf0(β) rises
continuously. The left-hand side of equation (23) is downward sloping, and is positive for all
β<β H where by deﬁnition f0(βH)=( 1+θ)κ. For all β<β H, the value of the LHS of eq
(24) is greater than that of equation (23). It follows that b β exceeds β
∗
.N o w ,i fλ>0,t h i s
will make b β even greater.
Proposition 6: (comparing welfare levels.) The cooperative solution yields a higher
welfare level than that of the Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Since this result is obvious, we will not present a detailed proof. It is useful,
however, to note the following points. From Proposition 2, the welfare under the cooperative
solution is Wcoop = ψ
∗
X0,w h e r eψ
∗
is given by equation (10). Similarly, it can be shown
that the welfare under the Markov-perfect equilibrium is
W
MPE = b ψX0 (25)
where
b ψ =
f(b β) − κ(1 + θ)b β















f(β) − κ(1 + θ)β
ρ − A + n(1 + θ)β
(27)
It is easy to show that ψ
∗






The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem is ψ










which is identical to (7) used to determine the cooperative equilibrium strategy β
∗
in Section
3. The second order condition is satisﬁe d .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h ec u r v eψ(β) deﬁned by (27)
reaches its maximum at β = β
∗
. Therefore the MPE solution b β must yields a smaller ψ,
hence a lower welfare. Figure 2 depicts the curve ψ(β) .
Remark: Since b β>β
∗
as shown in Proposition 5, we must have ψ
0(b β) < 0,w h i c h
indicates the welfare in the MPE case is decreasing in β, i.e. b β always lies to the right of
β
∗
(Figure 2 illustrates this situation).
Combining Propositions 5 and 6, it is interesting to note that the cooperative equilibrium
has both higher welfare level and greater resource growth rate. Let’s explore some intuition
behind these results. In the cooperative equilibrium or the social planner’s problem, the
agents know ex ante that their consumption levels will be equal thus the status-conscious
parameter λ doesn’t play a role in the equilibrium. In the MPE case, however, the agents
will observe the resource stock at the beginning of each period and make her own decision
about the extraction rate, each trying not to be behind, even though they know that in
the symmetric equilibrium their consumption levels will be equal ex post. The "positional
externalities" imposed by the status-consciousness can only be eliminated by cooperation.
We have shown in Proposition 2 that a fall in κ leads to a higher welfare in the cooperative
equilibrium. We now show that, in contrast, in the case of a non-cooperative equilibrium,
af a l li nκ can decrease the non-cooperative welfare, i.e., technological progress in resource
extraction can be welfare-worsening when agents are non-cooperative. Furthermore, the ab-
solute magnitude of the negative impact of technological progress on welfare is an increasing
function of the degree of status-consciousness. The next proposition is a formalization of
this result.
Proposition 7: A technological progress in resource extraction can reduce welfare in the
non-cooperative case. This fall in welfare is an increasing function of the degree of status-
consciousness.






















− (1 + θ)
)
(29)
Now, since the term inside the square brackets is negative, and
de β
dκ is also negative, the
sign of the expression inside the curly brackets is ambiguous. Let us explore the special
Cobb-Douglas case.
















+ κ(1 − μ)β
−μ £
(ρ − A)β
−1 +( n − 1)(1 + θ)
¤ < 0





1−μ [(ρ − A)+( n − 1)(1 + θ)β](1+θ)
(λ(1 − δ)+μ)(ρ − A)β
−1 < 0
Now, from (21), at κ =0
ρ − A +( n − 1)(1 + θ)b β =
(1 + θ)(1 − λ(1 − δ) − μ)b β
λ(1 − δ)+μ






1 − λ(1 − δ) − μ
(λ(1 − δ)+μ)(1− n(λ(1 − δ)+μ))
¸
(1 + θ) (30)
Substituting (30) into (29), we see that the eﬀect of an increase in κ on the equilibrium
welfare level is positive if and only if
(1 − μ)(1 − μ − λ(1 − δ)) > [1 − n(μ + λ(1 − δ))]
This inequality is equivalent to
n>
μ
μ + λ(1 − δ)
+( 1− μ)
Since the right-hand side is smaller than 2, it follows that the condition is satisﬁed if n ≥ 2.
We conclude that for the Cobb-Douglas case, a marginal increase in κ from a suﬃciently
small initial value κ0 will increase the Markov-perfect equilibrium welfare level. The greater




(1 − μ)(1 − μ − λ(1 − δ))(1 + θ)
[1 − n(μ + λ(1 − δ))]




Remark: This result represents the situation that a small increase in κ may be welfare-
improving because the beneﬁts from preserving the resource outweight the utility loss from
less extraction and consumption (see the case in Figure 2, ˆ β reduces to ˆ β
0
but the welfare
is higher than before). However, it won’t happen in the cooperative equilibrium since the
cooperative equilibrium extraction rate β
∗
is always the welfare-maximizing extraction rate.
4.2 Heterogeneous agents
So far we have focused on the case of homogeneous players. This section examines the
eﬀects of heterogeneity among agents on the properties of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria.
To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case where there are only two groups of players.
More speciﬁcally, let us assume that there are n1 ≥ 2 players described by the parameters
(ρ1,θ 1,κ 1) with the functions G1 and f1, and n2 ≥ 2 players described by the parameters
(ρ2,θ 2,κ 2) with the functions G2 and f2. The total number of players is n = n1 + n2. We
assume that assumptions A1-A3 hold for both group of players, and the agents in each group
compare their consumption with other members in the same group only14.
4.2.1 Analysis
Following the method used in section 4.1, we can set up the maximization problem for each
group and solve for equilibrium extraction strategies. The transition equations for agent i
in group 1 is:
˙ X = AX − (n1 − 1)(1 + θ1)β1X − (1 + θ1)ci1 − n2(1 + θ2)β2X
For agent i in group 2,
˙ X = AX − (n2 − 1)(1 + θ2)β2X − (1 + θ2)ci2 − n1(1 + θ1)β1X
The Hamiltonians become
Hi1 = G1 (zi1)F1(ci1,X) − κ1(1 + θ1)ci1 + (31)
ψi1 [AX − (n1 − 1)(1 + θ1)β1X − (1 + θ1)ci1 − n2(1 + θ2)β2X]
Hi2 = G2 (zi2)F2(ci2,X) − κ2(1 + θ2)ci2 + (32)
ψi2 [AX − (n2 − 1)(1 + θ2)β2X − (1 + θ2)ci2 − n1(1 + θ1)β1X]
14This assumption allows us to obtain closed form solution. The alternative assumption, that each agent
compares his consumption with the average of all agents, does not yield closed form solution, and it is not









and similarly for zi2.W ed e ﬁne δi =1 /ni.
Again we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, where all members of the same group use






= β2 where β1 and β2 are constants (33)
Using symmetry among individuals in the same group, we can write ψi1 = ψ1 and




















2 (β2) − κ2(1 + θ2) − (1 + θ2)ψ2 =0









[ρ1 − A +( n1 − 1)(1 + θ1)β1 + n2(1 + θ2)β2]=
−(1 − δ1)G
0











[ρ2 − A +( n2 − 1)(1 + θ2)β2 + n1(1 + θ1)β1]=
−(1 − δ2)G
0
2 (1)f2 (β2)+G2(1)[f2 (β2) − f
0
2 (β2)β2] (35)
The growth rate of the public asset is therefore given by
g = A − n1(1 + θ1)β1 − n2(1 + θ2)β2 (36)
We use the previous Cobb-Douglas example to obtain some closed-form results. Then










[ρ1 − A +( n1 − 1)(1 + θ1)β1 + n2(1 + θ2)β2]=
−(1 − δ1)λ1β
μ1












[ρ2 − A +( n2 − 1)(1 + θ2)β2 + n1(1 + θ1)β1]=
21−(1 − δ2)λ2β
μ2
2 +( 1− μ2)β
μ2
2 (38)
To solve this system of two equations analytically, we assume that κ1 = κ2 =0 .There




(λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1)[ρ1 − n2 (ρ1 − ρ2)(λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2) − A]





(λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2)[ρ2 − n1 (ρ2 − ρ1)(λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1) − A]
1 − n1 (λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1) − n2 (λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2)
(40)
Note that if θ1 = θ2, λ1(1−δ1)+μ1 = λ2(1−δ2)+μ2 < 1/n and n1 = n2 = n/2,t h e nˆ β1 > ˆ β2
if and only if ρ1 >ρ 2, i.e., the more impatient group extracts the resource stock at a faster
rate. In what follows, we do comparative statics for the case where 1−n1 (λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1)−
n2 (λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2) > 0.
Since this model is featured by relative consumption appearing in the agents’ utility
function, we are especially interested in the eﬀect of heterogeneity in the status-conscious
parameter λ on the equilibrium outcome. Starting with n1 = n2, consider a mean-preserving
spread of λ among agents, so that λ1 = λ +
η
n1,λ 2 = λ −
η
n2 with η>0, in other words, the
ﬁrst n1 agents become more status-conscious, and the remaining agents become less status-
conscious. How are the growth rate of public assets and welfare aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei n
η? The following proposition reports the result in the case.
Proposition 8 In the Cobb-Douglas case, with κ1 = κ2 =0 ,
(a) A mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the status-conscious parameter λ leads
to an increase of the public asset growth rate if and only if ρ2 >ρ 1, i.e., iﬀ the members of
the group with stronger status-consciousness are more patient. If the degrees of patience are
the same, i.e. ρ1 = ρ2, there will be no change in the growth rate of the public asset.
(b) If the status-conscious parameter λ is the only source of heterogeneity, a mean-
preserving spread in the distribution of λ across agents leads to an decrease of the social
welfare.
Proof:







(ρ2 − ρ1)(n − 2)
1 − n1 (λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1) − n2 (λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2)
22Where n1 = n2 = n/2. By assumption, 1−n1 (λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1)−n2 (λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2) > 0
and n>2,t h e r e f o r e
∂g
∂η > 0 iﬀ ρ2 >ρ 1.
(b) Social welfare is given by











If λ1 = λ+
η
n1,λ 2 = λ−
η

















∂η2 < 0 at η
∗ =0
This shows that, for small variations in η, the social welfare is maximized with respect to η
at the value η∗ =0 .
The above proposition shows that if λ diﬀers across the two groups, the social welfare
will be lower than in the case of homogeneous agents. Thus heterogeneity in terms status-
consciousness reduces social welfare.
Next, let us consider heterogeneity in terms of the appropriation cost parameter θ.
Proposition 9: In the Cobb-Douglas case, with κ1 = κ2 =0 ,
(a) The growth rate of the public asset is independent of the appropriation costs, θ1, θ2.
(b) If the appropriation cost θ is the only source of heterogeneity, a mean-preserving




(λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1)(ρ1 − n2 (ρ1 − ρ2)(λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2) − A)
1 − n1 (λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1) − n2 (λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2)
B2 =
(λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2)(ρ2 − n1 (ρ2 − ρ1)(λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1) − A)
1 − n1 (λ1(1 − δ1)+μ1) − n2 (λ2(1 − δ2)+μ2)
Substitution yields the equilibrium growth rate g = A − n1(1 + θ1)ˆ β1 − n2(1 + θ2)ˆ β2 =
A − n1B1 − n2B2.T h i ss h o w st h a tg is not aﬀected by θ1 and θ2.
(b) Let’s consider the social welfare under heterogeneity,










23Suppose θ1 = θ + ε
n1,θ 2 = θ − ε
n2,
Let’s assume that μ1 = μ2 = μ and denote V (ε)=( ρ2 − g)n1β
μ













(1 + θ2)2 B2 =0
⇒ ε
∗ =




































If ρ1 = ρ2,λ 1 = λ2
ε
∗ =






4.2.2 Simulation results: the joint eﬀects of λ and θ on social welfare
In this section the joint eﬀects of λ and θ on social welfare are given by simulation. Again,
suppose θ1 = θ + ε
n1,θ 2 = θ − ε
n2 and λ1 = λ +
η
n1,λ 2 = λ −
η
n2. Substituting them into
equation (41), we can express social welfare as a function of ε and η. The plot of social
welfare is given in Fig. 3 (assuming X0 =1 , ρ =0 .2, A =0 .1, n1 =1 0 , n2 =1 0 , δ =0 .1,
μ =0 .02, θ =0 .1, λ(1 − δ)=0 .02).
The saddle-shape diagram conﬁrms our ﬁndings in Propositions 8 and 9 that a mean-
preserving spread in the distribution of λ across agents leads to an decrease of the social
welfare, while a mean-preserving spread in the appropriation cost θ will increase the social
welfare, ceteris paribus. Therefore, if the agents are diﬀerent in the degree of status con-
sciousness, which reduces the social welfare, the policy maker can apply two tax rates to
these agents and can still achieve a second-best outcome.
245 Concluding remarks
This paper explores the role of status-consciousness in rent-seeking in a dynamic setting.
The agents in the economy are concerned with not only their absolute level of consumption,
but also the relative consumption level within their groups. In the cooperative equilibrium,
or equivalently the social planner’s problem, the outcome is not aﬀected by the concern
f o rr e l a t i v ec o n s u m p t i o n . I fa g e n t sb e h a v en o n - c o o p e r a t i v e l y ,w es h o wt h a tt h es t a t u s -
consciousness parameter λ indeed plays an important role in the model. A higher degree of
λ leads to more aggressive extraction eﬀorts, therefore the social welfare and the growth rate
of the public resource are lower. This eﬀect has not been explored in the previous literature
on rent-seeking models. We have therefore shown that “positional externalities” worsen the
“tragedy of the commons” problem.
Another feature of our model is that we introduce two types of cost within the rent-
seeking process, a "wastage-cost" θ a n da n" e ﬀort-cost" κ. In contrast with Long and Sorger
(2006), we show that an increase in κ will reduce the equilibrium rate of extraction and
increase the growth rate of the public asset. Thus if the policy maker’s primary objective
is to protect the public asset from over-extraction, imposing a higher eﬀort-cost (stricter
policing of money-laundering) is preferred. We also show that a technological progress,
i.e., a smaller κ, can worsen welfare in a rent-seeking equilibrium. The magnitude of this
welfare-worsening eﬀect is an increasing function of the degree of status-consciousness. In
the analysis for heterogeneous agents, we show that the heterogeneity in the status-conscious
parameter λ will reduce social welfare. However, if the agents are diﬀerent in both θ and λ,
we show that positional externalities caused by λ can be mitigated by diﬀerent wastage-costs,
which can be achieved by discriminatory tax rates.
There are several ways our model can be extended. First, one may suppose there exist
some external limits for the extraction of the public asset. Thus the agents will optimize
their extraction in a constrained problem. Second, with the use of a Cobb-Douglas utility
function, one can derive all results in closed form and obtain linear or log-linear equations
that are readily adaptable for empirical tests. These extensions are parts of our future
research plans.
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26APPENDIX
An alternative formulation of heterogeneity in status consciousness
In this Appendix, we consider the case where there are two groups of agents with diﬀer-
ent status consciousness parameters, λ1 and λ2, and assume that each agent compares his












n C−i1 + n2
n C2
Thus zi1 takes the value 1 if everyone has the same consumption level. If agent i of group 1
believes that all agents in his group use a linear extraction strategy cj1 = β1X and all the
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For the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we then have the following necessary conditions



























ψ1(1 + θ1) − κ1(1 + θ)
and
























n β1 + n2
n β2
¢2
A similar pair of equations holds for a representative agent of group 2. Again, the constancy
of β1 and β2 implies that ˙ ψ1 =0=˙ ψ2.
Now, using the assumptions that fi(βi)=β
μi
i ,a n dt h a tκ1 = κ2 =0 , we end up with the


















































































[ρ1 − A +( n1 − 1)(1 + θ1)β1 + n2(1 + θ2)β2]
1+θ1
−(1 − μ1)β1 − λ1β1
¡
n1−1



















[ρ2 − A +( n2 − 1)(1 + θ2)β2 + n1(1 + θ1)β1]
1+θ2












These two equations are highly non-linear, and we cannot rule out the possibility of multiple
equilibria. In the special case where λ1 = λ2,μ 1 = μ2, ρ1 = ρ2, n1 = n2, θ1 = θ2,t h e s et w o
equations yield a symmetric equilibrium b β1 = b β2 = b β where
b β =
(ρ − A)(λ(1 − δ)+μ)




We can then perturb λ1 and λ2 by setting λ1 = λ + η and λ2 = λ − η and ﬁnd how a small
increase in η (starting from η =0 ) will aﬀect b β1and b β2.D e ﬁne the functions M1(β1,β2,λ 1)
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b ≡ 1 − n(λ(1 − δ)+μ) > 0, d ≡
n(λ(1 − δ)+μ)
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=( b + d)(b − d)+2 a(b − d)=( b − d)(2a + b + d)























It follows that there will be no change in the growth rate of the public asset. The eﬀect on
welfare is however ambiguous due to the non-linearity of (42) and (43).
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32Figure 1: The determination of the equilibrium extraction rate
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33Figure 3: The joint eﬀect of heterogeneity in λ and θ on social welfare
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